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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                          
No. 07-3481
____________
MARSHALL J. KATZ, 
Appellant
vs.
DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY
UNITED STATES NAVY
____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 1:cv-04-02170)
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 1, 2008
Before:   AMBRO, WEIS and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed December 17, 2008)
____________
OPINION 
                         
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, a former civilian employee of the Navy, has made various Title
VII claims of employment discrimination and retaliation against the Secretary of the
2Navy.  After pursuing administrative remedies without success, he filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  After preparing a
comprehensive opinion, the District Court entered summary judgment for the Secretary
and denied the plaintiff’s claims. 
On appeal to this Court, plaintiff has asserted error as to only two of the
many claims presented to the District Court.  He asserts that he presented grounds
sufficient to excuse his failure to exhaust his religious discrimination claims before the
EEOC.  He also alleges that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether there was
a causal connection between his prior protected activity and the adverse employment
actions taken against him.  
In the proceedings that he brought before the EEOC, plaintiff asserted
religious and age discrimination claims.  However, he voluntarily abandoned those
administrative claims and thus did not exhaust his ability to obtain a remedy before the
EEOC.  Having chosen to waive the claims during the administrative proceeding, plaintiff
could not present them to the District Court.  See Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266, 272
(3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies under
Title VII before bringing an employment discrimination claim to the federal district
courts).
Plaintiff, however, contends that he was misled by the Navy’s withholding
of certain discovery material involving the existence of unofficial files kept on him.  The
3District Court heard that assertion and issued certain discovery directions to defendant. 
After examining the plaintiff’s claims of being misled and the Secretary’s response, the
District Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention, though it did not specifically address the
issue of unofficial files in its memorandum opinion.  We find no error in the District
Court’s decision or its proceedings in the discovery area.  We also agree that plaintiff has
not shown an adequate reason for waiving his administrative remedies.
Plaintiff further alleges that his prior protected activity, filing EEO
complaints and reporting a sexual assault, resulted in adverse employment actions.  He
specifically contends that he suffered temporary suspension of access to classified
materials, involuntary lateral assignment, a refusal to reinstate him to his previous
position, and failure to select him for promotion. 
To demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
must show, among other things, that “there was a causal connection between [his]
participation in [activity protected by Title VII] and [any] adverse employment action[s].” 
Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Nelson v.
Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)).  The District Court analyzed the record
and concluded that plaintiff had not presented such evidence in regard to his EEO
activity.  We find no error in the District Court’s review of the record and conclude that
plaintiff failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the alleged adverse
employment actions and all of his prior allegedly protected activity.
4Accordingly  the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
